




























































Being Oneself: Self-Consciousness in Husserl  
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Steven DeLay
Taking up phenomenology’s problem of intention-
ality in the wake of Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre in 
the introduction to Being and Nothingness says, 
«All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is 
consciousness of something […] All conscious-
ness is positional in that it transcends itself in 
order to reach an object, and it exhausts itself in 
this same positing». Continuing down the page, 
Sartre notes in turn that intentionality itself is 
only possible insofar as it is aware of itself. Just 
as an unconscious intentionality is unthinkable, 
so too all consciousness is self-consciousness. 
As he thus explains, «the necessary and sufficient 
condition for a knowing consciousness to be 
knowledge of its object, is that it be conscious-
ness of itself as being that knowledge». To pose Husserl’s problem of inten-
tionality, hence, is to pose with it the question of self-consciousness. Sartre 
asks: “What is this consciousness of consciousness?” Sartre’s question—
the question, in short, of what it is to be conscious of oneself—in what fol-
lows shall be ours as well.
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Taking up phenomenology’s problem of intentionality in the wake of Husserl, Jean-
Paul Sartre in the introduction to Being and Nothingness says, «All consciousness, 
as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something […] All consciousness is posi-
tional in that it transcends itself in order to reach an object, and it exhausts itself in 
this same positing» (1998, 7). Continuing down the page, Sartre notes in turn that 
intentionality itself is only possible insofar as it is aware of itself. Just as an uncon-
scious intentionality is unthinkable, so too all consciousness is self-consciousness. As 
he thus explains, «the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing conscious-
ness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be consciousness of itself as being that 
knowledge» (1998, 8). To pose Husserl’s problem of intentionality, hence, is to pose 
with it the question of self-consciousness. Sartre asks: «What is this consciousness 
of consciousness?» (1998, 8) Sartre’s question—the question, in short, of what it is 
to be conscious of oneself—in what follows shall be ours as well. What, we too shall 
ask, is self-consciousness? When somebody says “I,” to what does one refer? Or bet-
ter still, what ultimately is it to be oneself?
To say self-consciousness is ubiquitous to experience is not to say that, in 
being acquainted with oneself, such self-acquaintance is a matter of conceptual, re-
flective, or indeed intuitive knowledge. On the contrary, here knowing oneself means 
instead being aware of oneself in a definitively pre-re-
flective way. 1 Before taking myself as an object of the-
matic thought, I am already aware of myself, albeit 
tacitly. Contrast, for example, the experience one was 
having up to the moment of reading this sentence, and 
the experience one in turn now when asked to pause 
from one’s reading and to think explicitly one’s act of 
reading. Whereas before one was surely self-aware 
(one knew oneself to be reading), one had not yet taken oneself as a thematic object 
of focal attention. Indeed, as Sartre illustrates with his example of counting cigarettes, 
if there were no such implicit mode of self-acquaintance characterizing experience, 
and if rather we were aware of ourselves only by reflecting explicitly on ourselves, 
this would lead to an infinite regress of knowing consciousnesses. For, to any reflect-
ing consciousness that has taken another conscious act as its object, we can always 
ask of it: «How is it conscious? By some further act of consciousness?» To say “no” 
would be to concede the precise mode of pre-reflective self-consciousness that re-
flective theories of self-consciousness deny. 2 Were we 
to say “yes”, however, we may then put the same ques-
tion to this additional reflective consciousness we had 
the first: how, again, is it conscious of itself? In this 
way, the questioning goes on without end. Hence, «If 
we wish to avoid an infinite regress», concludes Sartre, 
«there must be an immediate, non-cognitive, relation of 
the self to itself». (Sartre 1998, 9) What more are we to 
say about this mode of pre-reflective self-awareness?
For Husserl, we know, the question of this 
self-consciousness is not an item of mere curiosity. 
Elucidating it is foundational to the entire enterprise 
of accounting for how experience is possible. As Dan 
Zahavi concludes the matter in an essay to which we 
shall turn later, 
1 This is the claim that Dan 
Zahavi attributes to all the classi-
cal phenomenologists, including 
not just Sartre, but also Husserl, 
Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. For 
a paper challenging this thesis that 
all consciousness entails self-con-
sciousness, see Schear (2009).
2 Aims to explain self-consciou-
sness by appeal to reflection 
are not new to the history of phi-
losophy. Most recently, such 
attempts have become popu-
lar in the analytic philosophy of 
mind. On the one side, there are 
those like William Lycan who hold 
that a conscious state is so inso-
far as a higher-order state takes 
the former as its object of percep-
tion—the so-called “HOP” theo-
ries of self-consciousness. See, for 
instance, Lycan (2004). On the other 
side, there are those with Peter 
Carruthers who contend instead 
that it is not a higher-order percep-
tive state, but rather a higher-order 
thought, by which a first-order state 
is thereby made conscious. In any 
case, whether the relation between 












































































Husserl also very well knew that his analysis of intentionality 
would lack a proper foundation as long as the problem con-
cerning the self-manifestation of consciousness remained un-
accounted for. That is, without an elucidation of the unique 
givenness of subjectivity, it would be impossible to account con-
vincingly for the appearance of objects, and ultimately phenom-
enology would be incapable of realizing its own proper task, to 
provide a clarification of the condition of possibility for mani-
festation (2003, 174). 
Many of Husserl’s readers from the beginning have 
noted the core role the ethos of rigor plays in his phe-
nomenology. For instance, in a famous study criticiz-
ing Husserl’s transcendental idealism, Roman Ingarden 
was to note the extent to which Husserl’s thought takes its bearings from a rational 
telos, one for Husserl entailing the need for both systematicity and intuitive clarity. 
Phenomenology for Husserl was to be the paragon of scientific inquiry. That means 
uncovering the foundations of what makes intentionality possible. As Ingarden com-
ments, «The concept of philosophy as rigorous science has a postulatory and pro-
grammatic character: Husserl wanted to realize such a philosophy and was convinced 
that its realization was possible when and only when philosophy became eidetic 
knowledge about pure consciousness and its intentional correlates obtained in im-
manent eidetically attuned perception» (1975, 23). Philosophy as rigorous science is 
thus “first philosophy” by grounding (and thereby explicating) how transcendental 
subjectivity makes intentionality and hence experience possible. In so doing, it like-
wise lays the basis for understanding how others sciences (both natural and human) 
are themselves able to acquire the knowledge of the world that they do.
As Husserl says, phenomenology therefore 
is scientific life-philosophy, i.e., a science that does not presuppose and is not based on the 
already existing sciences, but is rather a radical science, having as its fundamental scientif-
ic theme the concrete universal life and its life-world, the real concrete surrounding world 
(Staiti 2011, 168).
Yet there is nothing arid or abstract about this theoretical approach. For Husserl, in 
fact, phenomenology as radical science answers to life’s own urge to comprehend it-
self. A scientific life-philosophy, so understood, satisfies the very desire to make sense 
of existence. He says, 
Why do people turn to philosophy? First and foremost not, as is the case in all other disciplines, 
in order to be ‘productive’ and to finally become a professor. The urgency of life and the riddle of 
existence, which cause so much suffering to the dóskolos, lead 
to philosophy, and life demands an answer (Staiti 2011, 168). 3
But what is life? How is it given? Husserl was always to 
note consciousness does not in the first place give itself 
as ordinary intentional objects do. Though one always 
can (and sometimes does) reflect on oneself as the the-
matic object of one’s experience, this subject-object 
relationship of reflection is not the most basic way in 
3 For a very informative explora-
tion of how Husserl’s transcenden-
tal phenomenology strikes a deli-
cate balance between the extremes 
of Heinrich Rickert’s and Paul 
Natorp’s Neo-Kantian rationa-
lism, on the one hand, and Wilhelm 
Dilthey’s and Georg Simmel’s 
historicist life-philosophy, on the 
other, see Staiti’s study just cited.
state is said to be a matter of per-
ception or thought, self-consciou-
sness is explained by a reflective 
account that only generates an infi-
nite regress, as Sartre had said. 
It is a great merit of the pheno-
menological tradition’s notion of 
pre-reflective self-awareness that 
it undercuts such theories, avoi-
ding the confusion to which they 
give rise. A notable exception to 
this trend in the philosophy of mind 
to account for self-consciousness 
with reflective theories is Uriah 
Kriegel, whose work recognizes the 
existence of pre-reflective aware-
ness, though formulating it with an 













































































which we experience ourselves. Intentionality, which gives an object, is not itself giv-
en intentionally to begin with. I am not primarily an intentional object for myself. To 
use again Sartre’s own language, consciousness has a “non-thetic” awareness of it-
self, a tacit awareness of itself prior to reflection, prior even to any intentional rela-
tion whatsoever. 
What, then, accordingly is self-consciousness? Husserl formulates the view 
we have seen Sartre himself adopt. Inner time-consciousness accounts for the con-
sciousness of oneself:
Consciousness is necessarily consciousness in each of its phases. Just as the retentional phase 
is conscious of the preceding phase without making it into an object, so too the primal datum 
is already intended—specifically, in the original form of the “now”—without its being some-
thing objective (Zahavi 2003, 172).
For Husserl, it is in virtue of the structure of internal time-consciousness that an in-
tentional act is conscious of itself. If, then, intentionality is that by which we reach 
an object, we contact that object only because we have first been in touch with our-
selves. Before I cognize or otherwise relate to an object intentionally, I am in contact 
with myself. Here, it is question of a realm of passivity, a level of consciousness oper-
ating well before any actively constitutive act of the ego. Says Husserl,
Within subjectivity [Geistigkeit] we have two levels. They are indivisible because they are es-
sentially related to one another: the lower level—that of the mere psychic [seelisch] and the 
higher level, that of subjectivity [Geistigkeit] in an eminent sense. The lower level is that of 
pure passivity…(Staiti 2011, 184) 4 
Here, we may return to the Zahavi essay mentioned ear-
lier. In it, Zahavi formulates so as to answer a longstand-
ing objection—one formulated by Manfred Frank and 
Ernst Tugendhat among others—according to which 
Husserl never recognized the problem of self-con-
sciousness properly. Husserl, so the argument goes, re-
mained insensitive to the problem, because, enthralled 
to the problem of intentionality, he remained beholden 
to a subject-object model of self-awareness. As Zahavi 
explains the charge,
Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality 
to ever pay real attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality 
Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore 
settled with a model of self-awareness based upon the subject-object dichotomy, with its en-
tailed difference between the intending and the intended (Zahavi 2003, 157).
More importantly, perhaps, it is Michel Henry whose phenomenology of life that has 
most famously criticized the Husserlian account of pre-reflective self-conscious-
ness in terms of inner time-consciousness. In keeping with a fundamental distinction 
Henry draws between the appearing of consciousness and the appearing of the world, 
he says self-manifestation (what he calls “life”) takes place as a self-affection: «Life 
reveals itself. Life is self-revelation» (2019, 59).
Reminiscent of Kierkegaard for whom life is interiority, Henry in all of his 
4 It is important not to confuse 
passive synthesis—acts of which 
include association and motivation, 
for example—with pre-reflective 
self-consciousness itself as such. 
Though it must be emphasized 
that passive synthesis and inner 
time-consciousness are distinct, 
this is not to deny they are impor-
tantly related. For an account of the 
relation between them that also 
weighs in on the debate over how 
exactly to understand the relation 
between inner time-consciousness, 
on the one hand, and intentional 













































































works insists that self-manifestation is a mode of affectivity, of a pure immanence 
in which one experiences oneself as crushed against oneself without intentional rup-
ture, temporal delay, or structural difference:
If the Self relates to itself by experiencing itself in the absolute immanence of life and in it 
alone, phenomenology still asks: what does the phenomenological reality of this originary 
Affectivity that precedes every sentiment by making it possible—the originary phenomeno-
logical tonalities of this Affectivity are the suffering and joy in which the experiencing itself of 
life occurs, and thus every possible Self. Life is a pathos. Every me is an immanent pathos-fil-
led relation to itself (2019, 62).
From this perspective that sees consciousness as a radical immanence, it could appear 
Husserl’s own philosophy of consciousness, which explains self-givenness in terms of 
inner time-consciousness, fails to uncover the deepest level of self-experience. This is 
precisely what Henry contends, 
Let’s examine anew this Self, this me that I am. “Me,” wrote Husserl in a manuscript from the 
1930s, “I am myself [Ich bin Ich].” We cannot confine ourselves to such a statement, as impor-
tant as it may be. It is advisable to push the analysis further. Me, I am myself, but it isn’t me 
who has given me to myself. My life experiences itself, but it is not the one that has brought 
it into this condition of experiencing itself; such a condition de-
pends neither on its power nor its will (2019, 63). 5
Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness is an-
other instance of a philosophy that attempts to think 
self-manifestation according to the world’s appearing—
according to transcendence—rather than according to the pathos of life’s immanence. 
As Henry continues, «Thus, for Husserl, phenomenality is traditionally understood to 
start from consciousness, but consciousness is in essence intentional; it is nothing 
other than the movement by which it projects itself outside, so that phenomenality 
arises from this coming into the outside and is due to 
it» (2019, 58). 6 But as Zahavi notes, Henry’s criticism of 
Husserl according to which self-consciousness mistak-
enly is explained in terms of retentional modifications 
rather than an immediate impressional consciousness, 
misconstrues the latter’s position:
Husserl’s analysis is not meant to imply that consciousness only 
becomes aware of itself through the retention. On the contrary, 
Husserl explicitly insists that the retentional modification pre-
supposes an impressional (primary, original, and immediate) 
self-manifestation, not only because consciousness is as such 
self-given, but also because a retention of an unconscious con-
tent is impossible (Zahavi 2003, 172).
Husserl and Henry agree that all consciousness is 
self-consciousness. Furthermore, they agree such 
self-consciousness is not intentional. And, according to 
Zahavi, they both also understand the deepest level of 
non-intentional self-consciousness to be an immediate, 
6 Notice Henry’s criticism is not 
that Husserl distorts the character 
of self-manifestation by reducing it 
to a subject-object model (Frank’s 
and Tugendhat’s objection). His 
view, instead, is that despite his 
characterizing inner time-consciou-
sness as pre-intentional, Husserl 
nevertheless succumbs to the 
prejudice of “ontological monism”: 
portraying consciousness in terms 
of temporality as he does, subjecti-
vity’s own appearing is reduced 
to the world’s mode of appearing, 
that is to say the mode of exterio-
rity or transcendence. That Henry 
is identifying a problem concerning 
a more fundamental level of expe-
rience than mere object intentio-
nality becomes clear when, in the 
very next line after the one just cri-
ticizing Husserl, Henry writes, «It 
is with Heidegger that the wor-
ld’s appearing finds its highest 
degree of elaboration. As early as 
§7 of Sein und Zeit, the phenome-
non is explained according to the 
Greek—phainomenon—starting 
5 Henry’s most sustained criti-
cism of Husserl along these lines is 
to be found in Henry (2008). In the 
work, it must be noted Henry relies 












































































affective, radical passivity. Does this mean, thus, there is 
no disagreement at all, that contrary to Henry’s insist-
ence, Husserl sees the passive realm of self-affection as 
he does?
At least one reason comes to mind for think-
ing the rapprochement is not complete. The disagree-
ment concerns the very origin of life’s self-affection. As 
Henry concurs with Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto 
Death, if I am unable to be anyone but myself, that is, if 
being myself means being this singular individual I am, 
it is because I am unable to escape from myself. Being 
oneself is not a matter of existing outside oneself with 
others in the world. Nor, however, is it to be enclosed alone in a solipsistic interiori-
ty. The real disagreement, then, if there is one, between Husserl and Henry does not 
consist so much in how this structure of self-awareness should be characterized, but 
rather over its origin. What, if anything, brings it into being? Nobody, says Henry, has 
brought oneself into the condition of living, a fact Husserl’s analyses of passive syn-
thesis and internal time-consciousness never faced squarely. In the passive synthesis 
lectures, for instance, Husserl says this: 
the transcendental ego cannot be born; […] The ego as transcendental ego was eternal; I am 
now, and belonging to this Now is a horizon of the past that can be unraveled into infinity. 
And this means precisely, the ego was eternal (Husserl 2001, 469). 
Contrary to what Husserl argues here, one is not eternal, says Henry. Just as one has 
not given life to oneself, so the pure passivity in which one experiences oneself ac-
cordingly signals a power beyond oneself. In a twist sure to surprise anyone who has 
never bothered to read Henry closely for thinking Henry’s was simply an oversimplis-
tic philosophy of immanence, there in fact is, according to Henry himself, an Other 
lying at the depths of one’s inmost self. Always already brought into the condition of 
living, but never by oneself, being oneself is to be born.
from the root pha, phos, meaning 
‘light,’ such that appearing signi-
fies coming into the light, clarity, 
or ‘that wherein something can 
become something manifest, visi-
ble in itself’ [d.h. das, worin etewas 
offenbar, an ihm selbst sichtbar war-
den kann].’ The world […] is a que-
stion of exteriority, of the ‘outside 
of itself’ as such, as the second 
part of Sein und Zeit explicitly sta-
tes» (58-59). For a development 
of Henry’s criticism against the 
residue of ontological monism in 
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